Abstract. Sloan (1996) and a number of subsequent studies present evidence that a trading strategy based on publicly available accounting accruals earns abnormal returns of approximately 10% in the year following its initiation. This empirical regularity has been named the 'accrual anomaly'. In this paper I investigate the accrual anomaly along two dimensions. First, I evaluate whether the accrual anomaly is related to other anomalies documented in the finance literature. Second, I investigate whether different methods for calculating long-term abnormal returns have an effect on the returns to the accrual strategy. My results indicate that both mergers and divestitures have an effect on the returns generated by the accrual strategy. After excluding observations associated with either mergers or divestitures, there is a decrease of about 25% in the strategy's returns. Second, different calculation methods for benchmark portfolio returns do not have a material effect on the returns of the accrual strategy. Third, when book-tomarket is added to size as a second control for normal returns, returns to the accrual strategy decrease by approximately 20%. Fourth, the accrual strategy's returns are much larger in a sample of Nasdaq firms. Overall, I conclude that the accrual anomaly is sensitive to the series of tests conducted in this study, although a substantial portion of it remains unexplained. * I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Bill Schwert, Jerry Warner, Ross Watts (chair) and Jerry Zimmerman for their valuable comments and suggestions. I also benefited greatly from the insights of
Introduction
Capital market anomalies (or puzzles) have attracted the attention of researchers and market participants for at least four decades. According to Schwert (2001) , "anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with maintained theories of asset pricing". Investors are interested in anomalies because they potentially provide them with an opportunity to enhance portfolio returns. Academic researchers are interested in anomalies because they present a challenge to existing theories. As a result of these challenges new theories of asset pricing and market behavior as well as new research methodologies are developed.
Several anomalies exist in the accounting literature. The post earnings announcement drift (Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 1990) survived enough tests and different sample periods to lead Fama (1998) to state that it is "above suspicion". More recently, Sloan (1996) introduced what was later termed as the 'accrual anomaly'. According to Sloan (1996) , investors make systematic errors in assessing the implications of current earnings on future earnings. As a result, an investment strategy that exploits this hypothesized processing bias earns abnormal returns of around 10% in the year following the publication of financial statements. Unlike the post earnings announcement drift, in which investors seem to under-react to public information and return continuation arises, in the accrual anomaly investors overreact to information in earnings and a return reversal arises. Since Sloan (1996) , several studies investigated the accrual anomaly further. I review their results in section 2 of this study.
The interpretation of the evidence in the accrual anomaly literature has been controversial. On the one hand, some researchers accept the view that the accrual strategy's profitability is a manifestation of systematic pricing errors resulting from overweighting of earnings information and underweighting of cash flow information. Others are more hesitant to adopt this interpretation and call for a series of additional tests. For example, Kothari (2001) highlights several potential problems in calculating the returns to the strategy. Among the issues he mentions are better measures of long-term abnormal returns, survival biases and inference problems arising from cross-sectional dependence.
In this paper I address two broad research questions. First, I explore characteristics that cause or are correlated with extreme accruals. In particular, I show that extreme accrual firms are more likely to have experienced certain corporate events.
1 Since these events are known to be associated with abnormal returns, I examine to what degree the accrual anomaly overlaps with the "corporate events" anomalies. 1 For the purpose of this paper I define the term "corporate events" narrowly to include only mergers and acquisitions, initial public offerings, seasoned equity offerings, restructurings and divestitures. 2 The interpretation of the evidence regarding the long-term performance following corporate events is controversial and many are hesitant to attribute the findings to the market's inability to adequately price securities following corporate events. Nevertheless, the empirical regularity that firms underperform or overperform several benchmarks is still relevant to the accrual anomaly literature, which for the most part uses those same benchmarks.
Second, I apply new methods for calculating and drawing inference from long-term abnormal returns. For example, Lyon et al. (1999) promote using a different calculation method for benchmark portfolio returns, especially in samples of small firms. Since the accrual anomaly is driven by portfolios of extreme accruals that are dominated by small firms, I investigate whether this new method has an effect on the accrual anomaly. In addition, I examine whether the standard errors of mean abnormal returns to the accrual strategies are affected by two related factors. The first one is the extreme skewness of long-term abnormal returns and the second is the degree of cross-sectional as well as time-series dependence within portfolios of extreme accruals. To address these issues I employ the calendar-time method for calculating abnormal returns (Jaffe, 1974; Mandelker, 1974; Fama, 1998) .
The results I report indicate that corporate events, in particular mergers and divestitures, are related to the returns generated by the accrual strategy. After excluding observations associated with mergers and acquisitions, the strategy's hedge returns slightly decrease. The strategy's returns generated by the top accrual decile, where most mergers and acquisitions concentrate, decrease by about 50%.
When divestitures are excluded from the sample, returns to the accrual strategy decrease by about 20%.
When I exclude both mergers and divestitures, the returns to the accrual strategy decrease from 8.3% to 6.2%, a decline of about 25%.
Second, I show that the calculation methods promoted by Lyon et al. (1999) , which hold constant the composition of benchmark portfolios, do not have a material effect on the returns of the accrual strategy. If anything, they cause the strategy's returns to slightly increase. Third, I analyze the sensitivity of the strategy's returns to the inclusion of different benchmarks. The results indicate that when book-tomarket is added to size as a second control for normal returns, returns to the accrual strategy decrease by approximately 20%. Combining the exclusion of corporate events and different calculation methods leads to a decrease of about 25% in the strategy's returns. Fourth, I show that employing the calendar-time approach does not change the strength of the inference regarding the statistical significance of the returns to the strategy.
I also report an auxiliary result. I show that the accrual strategy behaves differently in the two subsamples of non-NYSE/AMEX and NYSE/AMEX firms. In particular, the hedge returns of non-NYSE/AMEX firms are higher and their composition is different. In the non-NYSE/AMEX sample, most of the returns are attributed to the short position of firms in the top accrual deciles. This is consistent with smaller Nasdaq firms being much more expensive to short sell.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes our current knowledge about the accrual anomaly. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection procedure. In section 4, I replicate the accrual anomaly on my sample and in section 5 I investigate the relation between corporate events and the accrual anomaly. The sixth section of the paper provides some additional tests that directly deal with the calculation of long term abnormal returns. These include more robust calculation methods of portfolio returns and accounting for skewness and cross-sectional dependence in calculating the standard errors of mean abnormal returns. Although these methodological issues have been raised in the finance literature for a number of years, they have not received attention in the accounting literature by researchers investigating the accrual anomaly. In section 7, I combine the effects of both corporate events and return calculation methods. Finally, section 8 concludes. Sloan (1996) shows that portfolios of firms with high (low) accruals earn negative (positive) abnormal returns in the year following portfolio formation. 3 A hedge portfolio of annually buying firms in the bottom decile of total accruals and selling firms in the top decile of total accruals earns a positive return of over 10% in the year following portfolio formation. 4 In addition, he shows that a large portion of the subsequent abnormal returns is realized around future quarterly earnings announcements. Sloan (1996) views the findings as being consistent with the market's inability to correctly impound the information in accruals into stock prices. More specifically, the market assigns a higher persistence to the accrual component of earnings and as a result over (under)-prices firms whose earnings contain high (low) accrual components.
Accrual anomaly: literature review
Several studies followed Sloan (1996) to further investigate the puzzling results. These studies can be divided into four groups: (i) studies investigating accrual components, (ii) studies exploring the behavior of third parties such as analysts, auditors and insiders, (iii) studies searching for cross-sectional variation in the accrual strategy's returns and (iv) studies assessing the extent to which the accrual anomaly is related to other anomalies. My study best fits into the latter category.
In the first line of inquiry, researchers decompose accruals into several components (e.g. changes in inventories, changes in accounts receivables, changes in accounts payable) and observe which part is more highly associated with the strategy's abnormal returns. Hribar (2000) and Thomas and Zhang (2002) follow this approach. 5 Both studies show that Sloan's results are related to accruals generated by extreme increases or decreases in the inventory accounts. Thomas and Zhang (2002) go further and find that changes in raw materials inventories have even higher abnormal returns associated with them. Hribar (2000) finds no evidence of mispricing in more transparent accruals, like special items. One interpretation 3 High accruals are income increasing and low accruals are income decreasing, as is evident in the summary statistics reported in table 1. 4 To make sure that all accounting information needed to execute the strategy is available, Sloan (1996) and other studies that follow calculate the strategy's returns over the 12-month period (or a longer one if appropriate) that starts four months after the end of fiscal year. 5 A more recent study with similar results is Chan et al. (2001) .
both studies attach to their findings is that the abnormal returns are a consequence of market's inability to see through earnings management.
Hribar (2000) examines the changes in working capital accounts in more detail. For example, he decomposes the inventory and receivable accounts into discretionary and non-discretionary components, based in part on their relation with growth in sales. He finds evidence that the discretionary components are more associated with mispricing. Continuing on the earnings management explanation, Xie (2001) constructs portfolios based on abnormal and normal accruals calculated using the Jones-model. He shows that abnormal returns are earned only in portfolios of abnormal accruals, i.e. the portion of accruals that is attributed to managers' accounting discretion. Richardson et al. (2001) decompose accruals to broader categories. In addition, they examine the returns to strategies based on long-term accruals. They find that their decompositions do not yield returns higher than the basic accrual strategy. Further, they report that long-term accruals are also associated with future abnormal returns.
In the second category, several studies investigate the interaction between the behavior of insiders, analysts and auditors with accrual information. Beneish and Vargus (2002) show that the direction of insider trading by top executives is related to accrual information. More specifically, highaccrual firms that also experience insider selling experience lower future returns than high-accrual firms that experience insider buying. Thus, it appears that insiders of high accrual firms can distinguish between high accruals that signify an improvement and those that signify a deterioration in future firm performance. Continuing on Xie's (2001) point, Beneish and Vargus (2002) find some evidence that in firms experiencing insider selling, high accruals are related to earnings management.
Two studies analyze the behavior of analysts. Bradshaw et al. (2001) employ an approach that does not use market prices as an indicator of market's inability to process earnings information. Instead, they examine the behavior of two information intermediaries: sell-side analysts and independent auditors.
Abstracting away from stock returns alleviates concerns about inadequate controls for risk that naturally arise in these types of studies. The authors find that analysts' forecast errors are negatively correlated with total accruals. That is, analysts' forecast errors are more negative for high accrual firms. This means that analysts do not incorporate into their forecasts the earnings' reversal that is associated with high accruals.
Overall, they view their results as further evidence that strengthen inference of the market's inability to correctly interpret information in accruals.
Barth and Hutton (2001) also examine analysts' role in interpreting accruals. First, consistent
with Bradshaw et al. (2001) , they find that the majority of analysts do not react in response to new information about accruals. Only 25% of analysts revise forecasts in a direction consistent with reversal of newly announced accruals. The authors label them active analysts. Second, they report that investors do not incorporate the information in the revisions of active analysts. That is, investors seem to ignore analysts. As a result, a hedge strategy that combines information in accruals with information about active analysts earns an astounding 27% in the year following its implementation.
In addition to their examination of analysts, Bradshaw et al. (2001) investigate the behavior of auditors. They find that although firms with high accruals exhibit higher incidence of SEC enforcement actions, their auditors are not more likely to issue qualified opinions. This means that auditors, too, do not seem to take into account the implication of high accruals.
In the third category, Ali et al. (2000) explore some cross-sectional characteristics of the accrual anomaly. They conjecture that if the accrual anomaly is a manifestation of investors' inability to correctly process information in financial statements, then proxies for the degree of investor sophistication should be related to returns generated by the accrual strategy. Specifically, returns to the accrual strategy are expected to be higher in firms that are associated with lower investor sophistication. They use variables such as size, institutional ownership and analyst coverage to proxy for investor sophistication. Their results are opposite to those expected under the naïve investor hypothesis. They find lower returns for smaller firms, firms that are covered by fewer analysts, and firms that are not largely held by institutions.
They interpret their findings as contradicting the interpretations promoted by Sloan (1996) and the studies that followed. That is, they put less weight on the story that misprocessing of information gives rise to the returns generated by the accruals strategy.
Finally, the fourth category, to which my study belongs, contains three additional papers. First, Collins and Hribar (2000a) find that the accrual anomaly and the post-earnings announcement drift are distinct from each other. They present a strategy that exploits the information in both accruals and earnings surprises. They report that the combined strategy generates higher returns than each individual strategy. Second, Fairfield et al. (2001) argue that the accrual anomaly is a subset of a broader anomaly related to investors' inability to correctly impound information about growth. Third, Desai et al. (2002) find that the accrual anomaly and the "value-glamour" anomaly proxied by the cash-flow-to-price ratio overlap. In this study, I show that the accrual anomaly is mostly separate from anomalies related to price behavior following corporate events.
The accrual anomaly is interesting to both accounting and finance researchers and practitioners for at least three reasons. First, the results challenge the efficient market paradigm, suggesting that abnormal returns can be earned by implementing a fairly straightforward strategy based on publicly available information. Second, the anomaly highlights an important incentive for managers to engage in earnings management. It shows that earnings manipulation can have real economic effects and that managers can potentially influence stock prices by choosing alternative accounting methods.
Traditionally, it has been thought that any such manipulations are transparent to investors and therefore provide no benefit to managers. Third, the higher association of earnings and stock returns, compared to the association of cash flows with stock returns, that has been investigated by accounting researchers for almost four decades perhaps needs a second look (e.g. Dechow, 1994) . The interpretation generally given to this high association is that earnings better reflect changes in firm value. An alternative explanation that arises in light of the accrual anomaly is that the higher association of earnings with stock returns merely reflects investor fixation on earnings.
Several unanswered questions remain. First, researchers still worry about the calculation of abnormal returns and whether the current procedures adequately control for risk. The long periods in which abnormal returns are realized (up to three years after portfolio formation) raise concerns about the interpretation of the evidence as solely against market efficiency. Kothari (2001) lists several important issues: (i) problems of measuring expected returns in long-term return studies; (ii) mismeasurement of expected returns arising from the characteristics of firms having extreme accruals; (iii) cross-sectional dependence and adequate measurement of standard errors and (iv) data problems arising from survival (see Kothari et al. 2002) . In this paper I answer Kothari's call that "The focus of future research should be to address (these problems)" and to reevaluate the findings of current research. To address some of these issues, I incorporate several recent methodological advancements in calculating long-term abnormal returns. I also explore a plausible alternative explanation that relates to the long-term under or overperformance of firms following corporate events.
In the current literature, there are several results that alleviate, to some extent, the above Finally, even if we narrowly focus on the accrual anomaly results and adopt the investor fixation hypothesis, the reasons for investors' fixation on earnings remain unclear. Is fixation a result of a cognitive bias like those proposed recently by various researchers to explain the book-to-market and momentum effects? (e.g., Hong and Stein, 1999; Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998 The measurement of other accounting variables is detailed at the bottom of tables 1 and 2. All accounting variables are deflated by average total assets (at time t and time t-1).
Stock returns. I obtain stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes as of 2001. The calculation of abnormal returns involves a few choices: (1) the type of benchmark portfolio used to adjust firms' raw returns (e.g. size, book-to-market), (2) the weighting scheme in calculating benchmark portfolio returns (equal-vs. value-weighting), (3) the composition of firms in the benchmark portfolio (uniform vs. changing) and (4) the type of abnormal returns to use for the analysis:
buy-and-hold (BHAR) or cumulative (CAR). In this paper I choose an equal-weighted, size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return as my reference normal return benchmark. I use NYSE cutoffs to assign firms to 10 non-equal-sized portfolios at the end of fiscal year. Abnormal-returns calculation is done after compounding monthly returns of both firms' raw returns and benchmark portfolio returns. Benchmark portfolios are implicitly rebalanced every month and their composition may change after the ranking period. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 describe in more detail the calculation approach. In section 6 I vary the methods for calculating abnormal returns and examine how they affect the returns on the accrual strategy.
Accrual strategy. In order to apply the accrual strategy, at the end of each year firms are ranked into deciles based on the magnitude of their deflated accruals. Once the rankings are determined, abnormal returns for each accrual decile are calculated by averaging the abnormal returns of all firms in a particular accrual decile. Like other studies in the literature, I start the calculation period four full months after the end of fiscal year. This assures that all the information in the financial statements is available to implement the strategy. Second, it is evident that firms with extreme accruals, those that occupy the top and bottom accrual deciles, are smaller in terms of market capitalization. Similar pattern is also present for total assets or total revenues. All these variables exhibit an inverted U-shaped pattern with respect to the accrual deciles. Moreover, the median size of low accrual firms is smaller than that of high-accrual firms (p-value smaller than 1%). Notice, however, that the mean size of low accrual firms is larger than the mean size of high accrual firms.
Descriptive statistics
Third, high-accrual firms have lower book-to-market ratios. Starting with decile 8, there is a decrease in the median book-to-market ratio. It falls from around 0.55 to 0.51 in decile 8, 0.48 in decile 9
and 0.45 in the high accrual decile. The difference in median book-to-market ratios between the low and high accrual deciles is significant at conventional levels.
Fourth, firm performance measured both in terms of contemporaneous stock performance and in terms of accounting rates of return and growth, is increasing monotonically with accruals. For example, the median raw return in the fiscal year for which accruals are measured increases from 3.2% in the lowaccrual decile to 16.6% in the high-accrual decile. The median return on assets in the low accrual decile is 5.5% and it increases to 10.5% in the high accrual decile. The median growth in sales is 1.9% for the low-accrual decile while it is 23.4% in the high-accrual decile. This difference may be slightly misleading because of the larger preponderance of mergers in the high accrual deciles and of divestitures in the low accrual deciles. Controlling for this issue, however, median sales growth are still different across the extreme accrual deciles (1.4% for the low decile and 20.2% for the high decile).
Fifth, compared to firms in the middle accrual deciles, forecasts of long-term growth are slightly larger for low accrual firms (13.5% vs. 12%) while they are much larger for high accrual firms (18% vs.
12%).
Finally, I also report summary statistics on two common measure of firms' degree of solvency.
The first is Altman's Z, due to Altman (1968) that measures a company's financial strength. Altman's Z is negatively correlated with the probability of bankruptcy. The second measure is Ohlson's O, due to Ohlson (1980) . It is positively correlated with the probability of bankruptcy. Table 1 reveals that the exante probability of bankruptcy is monotonically decreasing as we move from the low to the high accrual deciles. That is, low accrual firms are more risky in terms of bankruptcy probability than high accrual firms. The median Z-score of low accrual firms is 2.7 and it reaches 3.9 in the high accrual decile. The O measure is -0.54 for the low accrual firms and it reaches -1.14 in the high accrual decile.
All the patterns mentioned above (size, book-to-market, performance, bankruptcy risk) are also evident in unreported summary statistics of non-NYSE/AMEX firms.
Replicating the accrual anomaly
Decile returns analysis. To investigate the accrual anomaly in more depth, I first replicate it and contrast the results with those of previous studies. Table 2 reports the size-adjusted returns on a number of portfolios ranked on total accruals as well as on several accrual components. Basically, this table
replicates the results in Sloan (1996) and Thomas and Zhang (2002) . There are several differences. First, in panel B of Table 2 I also report returns for a sample of non-NYSE/AMEX firms. Previous studies that considered non-NYSE/AMEX firms generally pooled them together with NYSE/AMEX firms and/or excluded a substantial subset of them based on variables such as size. 6 This sample dissection is important because differences in the returns to the accrual anomaly that are correlated with exchange membership can help researchers understand the phenomena better. Second, the sample period in table 2 is 1988-1999, which enables the calculation of accruals based on the cash-flow statement. The different sample period also enables an out-of-sample replication of Sloan's (1996) original result.
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The first column of Table 2 , panel A, shows the basic Sloan (1996) result. A hedge portfolio that is short on firms in the top accruals decile and long on firms in the low accruals decile generates a return of 8.3% in year t+1, i.e. the 12-month period starting 4 months after the end of the fiscal year on which the rankings are based. This return is lower than that reported in Sloan (1996) . 8 Out of the 12 annual returns in the sample period, we see that 10 were positive (NPOS=10). We can reject the null hypothesis that positive and negative returns are equally likely with an associated p-value under 1%. The second column reports the results of a similar strategy when the ranking is based on accruals that are calculated from the statement of cash flows. We see that the return to this strategy is 10.2%, higher than the return in the first column. This result is similar to that of Collins and Hribar (2000b) . They attribute the higher returns to the fact that using cash-flow-based accruals leads to a more accurate ranking, whereas the rankings that are based on balance sheet accruals are noisy.
The rest of the columns in Table 2 , panel A, report returns to strategies that are based on rankings of several accrual components. The results are generally consistent with those reported in Thomas and Zhang (2002) , although there are a few differences. First, their finding of higher returns to various inventory strategies are not as strong in my sample. For example, I find that the returns from an inventory-based strategy (8.1%) are slightly lower than the accrual based strategy (8.3%). In contrast, Thomas and Zhang (2002) report these returns to be 11% and 8.8%, respectively. The differences are not attributed to the more recent sample period I use, because similar results (unreported) are obtained for the longer period of 1970-1997, which is used in Thomas and Zhang (2002) . Second, the composition of the hedge return is different. While most of the hedge returns (about 80%) in Table 2 are attributed to the long portfolio (i.e. the portfolio of low accruals), the returns in Thomas and Zhang (2002) are mostly attributed to the short portfolios (about 60%).
Panel B of Table 2 lower than those reported in the two panels of table 2. The (non-) NYSE/AMEX sample produces a return of 6.7% (14.6%) compared to 8.3% (20.5%) in table 2. The reason for the difference is that the hedge strategies in table 2 do not impose a linear relation between accruals and future returns.
The accrual anomaly and corporate events 9
This section addresses the possibility that at least part of the accrual anomaly can be traced back to various anomalies that were previously documented in the finance literature. These include the longrun under-performance following mergers and acquisitions, initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings and long-run over-performance following corporate restructurings and divestitures. 10 The cause for concern is that mergers and acquisitions are accompanied by high total accruals, especially accruals that are calculated based on the balance sheet. The main reason for the correlation between accruals and mergers is mechanical (e.g. Collins and Hribar, 2000b) . The end-of-the-year balance sheet of a merged firm is not comparable to its beginning-of-the-year balance sheet because the latter only contains the parent firm while the former contains both the parent and the new subsidiary. As a result of the merger, there is a mechanical increase in many balance sheet items. Since accruals are calculated as the sum of differences in successive balance sheet accounts, they will be high if we compare the consolidated end-of- calculates the changes in balance sheet items based on differences between successive balance sheet items. This is the method researchers employ when using Compustat data because Compustat records its numbers as they were reported in the original financial statements. Thus, according to column 4, inventory increased by $1.8 billion between 1998 and 1999. However, columns 2 and 3 illustrate that around $200 million of this increase is attributed to the addition of new firms into the 1999 balance sheet.
The real increase in inventory is $1.6 billion. It can be computed by subtracting column 2 from column 1.
Alternatively, with Compustat data, this figure is taken out of the cash flow statement (data 303). In a similar vein, corporate restructurings and divestitures are suspected to be followed by low accruals, as firms that were consolidated in one year no longer appear in the balance sheet in the subsequent year.
11
High accruals also occur following IPOs and SEOs. The reason in this case is not mechanical.
These firms are likely to increase their investment in working capital following equity offerings. These increased investments lead to high accruals.
It is hypothesized that portfolios of large accruals contain a higher frequency of firms that have recently gone through an M&A, IPO or SEO, while portfolios of low accruals contain a higher frequency and Ritter (1995); Mitchell and Stafford (2000) . Restructurings/Divestitures: Cusatis et al. (1993) . Fama (1998) reviews and evaluates much of the evidence. 11 A good example of the effect of divestitures is in the 1998 financial statements of Silicon Graphics (SGI The results overwhelmingly support hypothesis H1a. They indicate that when accruals are ranked based on the balance sheet (Panel A), mergers and acquisitions, equity issuances and debt issuances concentrate in the high deciles of accruals, and in particular the top decile. All the Z-statistics of tests that evaluate the differences in frequencies between either the top and bottom accrual deciles or the top three and bottom three deciles are significant at least at the 1% level. There is a fairly monotonic increase in the frequencies of M&A's and equity and debt issuances as we move from the lowest to the highest accrual deciles. For example, when I flag M&A's based on differences in inventory changes (M&A3), 26.5% of the observations in decile 10 are M&A's while only 7.3% are such in decile 1. The fourth flag, M&A4, that is based on the acquisition figure in the cash flow statement exhibits lower frequencies than the other four flags. In decile 10, 17.6% of the observations are M&A's compared to 4.8% in the bottom decile.
Frequencies of corporate events
The reason for the lower frequencies is that this flag only identifies cash-paid M&A's.
A similar pattern, with an opposite direction, is apparent in the restructuring flags. As expected, there is a statistically significant concentration of REST1, REST2 and DIVEST in the bottom deciles of accruals.
Looking at panel B we see the effect of calculating accruals based on the cash flow statement on the distribution of corporate events across accrual deciles. In general, the frequencies of corporate events are much more uniform across the deciles compared to panel A, although in most cases there is still a statistically significant concentration in the top (or bottom in the case of divestitures) accrual deciles. It also seems that the concentration of REST2 in the bottom accrual deciles has become stronger. The differences between panel A and panel B illustrate the bias that is embedded in calculating accruals from the balance sheet and show that calculating accruals from the cash flow statement mitigates the bias, although it does not eliminate it entirely. Table 5 provides some information on the differences in the magnitude of accruals as a function of various corporate events flags. As expected, in most of the flags, we observe a higher level of accruals when firms are associated with a corporate event. For example, total accruals of firms with M&A1 are -2.3% of total assets compared to -4.2% of total assets for firms whose M&A1 flag is off. On the other hand, as expected, the accruals of restructured firms are much lower than those of firms that have not had a restructuring.
Accrual anomaly after excluding corporate events
Having established that the top accrual decile contains a higher frequency of M&A's, IPOs and SEOs, while the bottom accrual decile contains a disproportionate number of restructurings, I now look at hypothesis H2a. This hypothesis conjectures that a higher frequency of corporate events in top (bottom) accrual decile, coupled with the documented under (over) performance of firms following these transactions, leads to the possibility that some of the accrual anomaly can be traced back to the long-run performance following corporate events. Therefore, in this section I examine how the returns to the accrual strategy change as a result of excluding from the sample firms that experienced corporate events.
Frequencies of mergers and acquisitions after exclusion
First, I examine the distribution of the various M&A flags, after excluding a different M&A flag.
This will give some idea about any variation left across accrual deciles after controlling for one flag. This information is important to assess the power of the tests. I perform the analysis only on mergers and acquisitions because they have five different flags. The frequencies are reported in To judge which flag has the strongest effect on smoothing the frequencies of M&A's across accrual deciles, I examine the average z-statistics in each panel of table 6. The baseline average zstatistics in panel A, before excluding certain firm-years, is 14.7 for z-stat1 and 52.5 for z-stat2.
Excluding M&A5, M&A3 and M&A2 leads to a similar effect on the average z-statistics. The average zstat1 falls to 0.3, 0.5 and 0.9, respectively, while the average z-stat2 falls to 8.9, 10.0 and 11.2. The rest of the flags are ranked as follows: M&A1 (z-stat1=2.9, z-stat2=13.9); M&A4 (3.2, 21.9).
Returns to the accrual strategy
In this section, I test hypothesis 2 that helps us learn about the sensitivity of returns to the basic accrual strategy, which is based on total accruals calculated from the balance sheet, to the exclusion of firm-years associated with various corporate events. The results are reported in M&A's, debt and equity issues. Looking first at the effect of excluding M&A firms, we see that the returns to the strategy decrease by up to 10%, depending on which flag is chosen. For example, when M&A3, the inventory-based flag, is excluded, the returns decrease slightly, from 8.3% to 8.1%. Other flags, like M&A1 and M&A2, exhibit an increase in hedge returns. Returns decrease to 6.8% for debt issues, while they increase to 8.9% for equity issues.
Since corporate events discussed here concentrate in the top accrual deciles, it is also interesting to examine the effects of excluding corporate events on each extreme accrual decile separately. Recall that excluding corporate events associated with long-term underperformance is expected to increase the returns in each decile, but to decrease the hedge returns because of the disproportionate concentration of these events in the top accrual decile. Indeed, as expected, the returns on the top accrual decile decrease regardless of the M&A indicator. For example, when M&A3 is used, returns on the top accrual decile increase and turn positive, from -1.3% to 0.1%. There is also a discernible effect on the returns in the top accrual decile when debt or equity issues are excluded. In a similar vein, returns on the bottom accrual decile increase. For example, in the case of M&A3, returns increase from 7.0% to 8.3%.
Restructurings and divestitures.
The effect of excluding firms that underwent divestitures and restructurings is reported in the columns headed REST1, REST2 and DIVEST. The returns decrease from 8.3% to 7.1% and 6.6% when REST2 and DIVEST are considered, while they slightly increase to 8.5%
when REST1 is considered.
Combined effects of M&A3 and DIVEST. The last column of table 7 reports returns on the accrual strategy when the effects of both M&A's and divestitures are combined. After excluding firms based on M&A3 and DIVEST, returns to the accrual strategy decrease from 8.3% to 6.2%, a reduction of about 25%. Note that these two flags are, by construction, independent.
To summarize, this section shows that excluding corporate events has some effect on the returns of the accrual strategy in the sample of NYSE/AMEX firms. M&A's and divestitures each account for up to about 10% of the strategy's returns. When combining the two, returns to the accrual strategy decrease by about 25%, from 8.3% to 6.2%. Unreported results indicate that these effects are less evident in a sample of non-NYSE/AMEX firms possibly because of the less frequent occurrence of mergers and acquisitions in these firms.
Types of mergers and acquisitions
Several studies in the finance literature show that the post-event stock performance of mergers varies with certain transaction characteristics. For example, Loughran and Vijh (1997) , Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) report that firms using stock as currency in a merger under-perform while firms using cash over-perform. Although the reason for this empirical regularity is still under debate, it is interesting to examine the interaction between mergers, form of payment and the accrual anomaly.
In this section, I distinguish between the different types of mergers to explore whether excluding any particular type leads to a more apparent reduction in the returns to the accrual anomaly. More specifically, I separate mergers based on (i) the form of payment used in the merger and (ii) the accounting method used (pooling or purchase). I obtain information on both the form of payment and the accounting treatment from the SDC database. Since a particular firm can have multiple mergers in a fiscal year, I classify firms to each category (cash, stock or pooling) if more than 50% of a firm's mergers in a particular year use cash, stock or pooling. Table 8 reports the results of excluding mergers based on their characteristics. The results indicate that after excluding cash mergers, the returns to the bottom accrual decile increase to 8.8% and the total hedge returns increase to 9.6%. These increases are contrary to expectations formed based on prior studies which show that cash-paid mergers do not under-perform in the period following the merger.
When excluding stock-paid mergers, the returns to the strategy decrease. However, they do not decrease by more than they do in table 7. Not surprisingly, the pooling results are very similar to the stock results.
Overall, it seems that separating mergers more finely, based on the form of payment, does not lead to a more apparent reduction in the returns to the accrual strategy. One possibility for these unexpected results is the potential low quality of the SDC identifiers.
Long-term abnormal returns and the accrual anomaly
The calculation of long-term abnormal returns has been the subject of extensive research in the finance literature for a number of years. 12 Lyon et al. (1999) describe the analysis of long-term abnormal returns as treacherous. The problems raised in the different studies are relevant to the accrual anomaly literature because the accrual strategy also requires calculation of long-term abnormal returns. In addition, the success of the strategy is driven by firms in the extreme accrual deciles. These deciles predominantly consist of small firms, which are a special cause for concern in the calculation of long-term abnormal returns (e.g. Lyon et al., 1999; Brav and Gompers, 1997) .
Despite these considerations, no study investigating the accrual anomaly has directly addressed the issues and attempted to account for them using other calculation methods and different statistical tests.
In this section I fill this void. I discuss several issues that are relevant for the calculation of abnormal returns and the statistical tests performed based on them. Section 6.1 describes the advantages and disadvantages of the two main methods for calculating long-term abnormal returns: (i) the buy-and-hold method (BHAR) and (ii) the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) method. Section 6.2 focuses on different methods for calculating benchmark portfolio returns under the BHAR method. The section draws mainly from Lyon et al. (1999) . Section 6.3 discusses the "bad model" problem. The above three issues are concerned with an appropriate calculation of abnormal returns. Section 6.4 is concerned with the effects of skewness and cross-sectional dependence on inference from t-tests. Both of these issues relate to an appropriate calculation of the standard errors of abnormal returns. In section 6.5 I present the results.
BHAR vs. CAR
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns. All studies in the accrual anomaly literature calculate buyand-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of firm i during period T in the following way:
where R it is the return of firm i in month t, p is the portfolio (usually size-based) to which firm i is assigned in the beginning of period T, and m=12, 24 or 36, depending on the length of the period under study. Typically, the calculation period starts four months after the end of the fiscal year whose accruals are ranked.
Statistical inference is conducted on two quantities. First, some studies evaluate the statistical significance of the returns to each accrual decile separately. This examination is possible using two approaches, pooled and time-series. Second, all studies evaluate the statistical significance of the returns on the hedge strategy, i.e. returns to the low accrual decile minus returns to the high accrual decile, using a time-series approach. Table A3 of the appendix summarizes the approaches and provides the formulas for each statistic. In sections 6.4 and 6.5 I discuss the assumptions underlying each of the above methods and assess their validity in the context of the accrual anomaly literature.
Cumulative abnormal returns. The literature on long-term abnormal returns also proposes to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Under this method, monthly abnormal returns are summed over the period under study, according to the following formula:
where p is defined in the same manner as in the BHAR. Dividing CAR by the number of months, m, results in an average abnormal returns (AAR) for the period.
Each of the methods has advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of the BHAR method is that it correctly tracks the returns earned by a buy-and-hold investor because it takes into account the compounding of returns. In contrast, the CAR method does not compound returns and therefore its returns do not reflect the profits (or losses) of investors. If researchers are specifically interested in returns to trading strategies, like in the case of the accrual anomaly, then BHAR is preferred.
However, BHAR introduces serious problems. First, as I discuss in section 6.3, the measurement of normal returns is exposed to the "bad model" problem. Because of compounding, BHAR is likely to magnify measurement errors, which increase with the calculation horizon. Second, BHAR produces much more skewed returns and as a result is more likely to be exposed to skewness biases. Third, BHAR is more exposed to cross-sectional dependence problems, which increase in sample size. In fact, one of the solutions for cross-sectional dependence I discuss in section 6.4 is the calendar time approach, which by its nature requires CAR's. Because of all these disadvantages, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) as well as Fama (1998) prefer CAR's over BHAR's. Lyon et al. (1999) prefer the BHAR method. However, they recommend using several methods to have a clearer perspective of the phenomenon under study.
Methods of calculating returns of benchmark portfolios
In this section I discuss the procedure of calculating the returns on the benchmark portfolio (the second term in equation 1). This issue is relevant regardless of the asset-pricing model being used or the type of benchmarks employed (e.g. size, BM, Size-BM and more). It is also important for both calculation methods (CAR or BHAR). Barber and Lyon (1997) demonstrate that the returns of benchmark portfolios are subject to two biases that relate to the portfolio composition at the time of an event (or at the point of ranking, in the case of portfolio-based strategies): (i) rebalancing bias and (ii) new listing bias. The rebalancing bias refers to the fact that the returns on the benchmark portfolios are calculated assuming monthly rebalancing while the returns on the sample portfolio are not rebalanced. Monthly rebalancing means that firms with previous high (low) returns are implicitly sold (bought). Since it is known that returns in adjacent months are negatively correlated due to, for example, the bid-ask bounce, rebalancing causes the benchmark returns to be higher than they otherwise would have been.
The new listing bias refers to the fact that the composition of the benchmark portfolio changes as a result of new firms being added to it after the event date. Since new firms underperform various benchmarks (e.g. Ritter, 1991) , this generates deflated benchmark returns.
For the BHAR method, which is more widely used in the accrual anomaly literature, Lyon et al.
(1999) outline a procedure that is able to eliminate these biases. According to it, returns of benchmark portfolios are first compounded, over period t (1,3 or 5 years), for each individual firm that is in the portfolio at the beginning of the cumulating period(s) and only then are averaged across each portfolio. where N t is the number of firms in the benchmark portfolio at any month t, after the event data.
The new listing and rebalancing biases are shown to be more prominent in small firms. Over the sample period used in Lyon et al. (1999) , R P BH results in benchmark returns that are lower than those obtained by R P
REB
. This indicates that the rebalancing bias, which is expected to cause benchmark returns to be higher, is the dominant one.
This is relevant to the accrual anomaly because small firms dominate the extreme accrual deciles.
My goal is to investigate how much of an effect this issue has on the top and bottom accrual deciles.
Since both of these deciles are dominated by small firms, as is evident in the summary statistics presented in table 1, it would be expected, based on the findings in Lyon et al. (1999) , that abnormal returns in both deciles will be higher as a result of using lower benchmark returns. The overall effect on the hedge returns to the accrual strategy is left for empirical examination.
Bad model problems
Every calculation of long-term abnormal returns requires a model for expected returns. All models have errors inherent in them but these errors get exacerbated as we extend the calculation period, especially when using the BHAR method. A number of firm characteristics have been identified in the literature to capture the risks that are priced by the market. These include firm size and book-to-market ratio. However, these characteristics are still problematic for extremely small firms. Fama and French (1993) point out, and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) reemphasize, the fact that for 3 out of 25 Size-BM portfolios, the three-factor model does not explain fully the cross-section of stock returns.
In the context of the accrual anomaly, Kothari (2001) emphasizes that errors in the model of expected returns are magnified when long-term returns are involved. In addition, Kothari (2001) argues that the determinants of normal returns are prone to change in samples of firms with extreme characteristics, like extreme accruals.
Recent advances in asset-pricing studies have identified another factor that explains the crosssection of stock returns. Carhart (1997), following the momentum findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), promotes the use of an additional factor that tracks returns of recent winners and losers.
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According to the momentum effect, firms that have had high returns in recent months (winners) continue to earn high returns. In a similar vein, bad performers (losers) continue to earn low returns. Going back to table 1, we see that recent stock returns (RET12) of firms in the bottom accrual decile are low, while they are high for firms in the top accrual decile. Therefore, the momentum factor predicts high returns for top accrual firms and low returns for low accrual firms. The opposite, however, is true. Therefore, ex-ante it seems that if the momentum factor is accounted for, the returns to the accrual strategy will increase. It is still an empirical question, however, in part because of the length of time for which the momentum effect lasts.
Thus, in this study I examine whether a finer size partitioning as well as an adjustment for other known firm characteristics, like book-to-market and momentum, are able to partially explain the returns from the accrual strategy.
Skewness and cross-sectional dependence
The t-statistics in table A3 of the appendix rely on several assumptions. In this section I discuss these assumptions in light of both skewness and cross-sectional dependence that are likely to be present in the context of the accrual anomaly.
The statistical significance of the mean abnormal returns in each accrual decile can be assessed using both a pooled and a time-series method. Looking at the pooled method first, the distributions of BHAR d and BHAR dT are asymptotically normal according to the central limit theorem. (The same is true of the distribution of BHAR dT in equation IIa.) This approximation, however, depends on the rate of convergence to normality, which in turn is a function of the number of observations underlying the mean, the degree of non-normality of the underlying variable that is being averaged (in this case one-year abnormal returns) and the degree of cross-sectional dependence in the sample under study (Brav 2000; Sutton 1993 ). Since the degree of non-normality and cross-sectional dependence varies, the use of this approach is problematic.
The second approach, based on time-series averages and standard deviations, can be used for both individual deciles and hedge portfolio returns. Two underlying assumptions are worth mentioning. First, the components of the time series average need to be approximately normal. Otherwise, their mean is not assured to be normally distributed because of the relatively small number of components underlying it. This is true for both equation IIb and IIIb. With respect to the hedge strategy, another related assumption is that the linear combination of the returns to the top and bottom accrual deciles is also normal. However, it is not clear whether the abnormal returns of each accrual decile achieves a reasonable convergence to normality. This depends, as mentioned above, on sample size, the degree of non-normality and the degree of cross-sectional dependence in each accrual decile.
The second assumption underlying the time-series approach is the independence of each component underlying the time-series mean. This assumption requires that all returns are calculated during the same calendar period. However, as I demonstrate below, this assumption is not innocuous when firms whose fiscal-year-ends differ are pooled together into a single portfolio. Calendar-time approach. To overcome the problem of cross-sectional dependence, I use the calendar-time approach promoted by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) . This method was first used in Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) and has recently gained popularity in the finance literature. Because this method requires tracking of monthly returns in calendar time by using CAR's, it can also be helpful in overcoming the skewness inherent in buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Another advantage of this method is that it contains more observations than a time-series method based on annual returns. Details on the approach are available upon request and are also outlined in Jaffe (1974) and in Mandelker (1974) .
Results
In , "buy-and-hold" benchmark returns that control for the new listing and rebalancing biases.
In addition, I use several benchmarks to calculate normal returns as follows: (i) Size subtracts from each firm's annual raw return, the equal-weighted return of one of 10 size portfolios based on NYSE cutoffs. This benchmark is the one used in tables 2 and 6; (ii) BM subtracts from each firm's annual raw return, the equal-weighted return to 10 book-to-market portfolios based on NYSE cutoffs; (iii) BM+SIZE subtracts from each firm's annual raw return, the return of one of 70 size-book-to-market portfolios based on 14 size portfolios (where the lowest size decile is partitioned to 5 quintiles) that are further decomposed into 5 BM quintiles; (iv) Momentum subtracts from each firm's annual raw return, the equalweighted return to 10 momentum portfolios based on the 12-month return up to one month before the implementation of the accrual strategy; (v) BM+SIZE+momentum subtracts from each firm's annual raw return, the return of one of 125 size/book-to-market/momentum portfolios.
Effect of different portfolio calculation methods. I examine whether differences exist between the returns to the accrual strategy as a result of switching between portfolio calculation methods, holding the benchmark for normal returns fixed. When the buy-and-hold method is used, returns to the strategy decrease or increase, depending on the normal-return benchmark employed. For example, when size is the benchmark, returns slightly decrease from 9.1% to 8.9%. When BM+Size+momentum is used as a benchmark, returns increase from 8.3% to 8.5%.
Unreported results on the subsample of non-NYSE/AMEX firms show that the effects of the buyand-hold methodology on abnormal returns are similar. The only exception is when BM+size is the benchmark. In that case, hedge returns increase substantially from 8.4% to 10.2%.
Effect of different normal-return benchmarks. I now turn to the left part of table 9 and compare
the results obtained from the use of several benchmarks for normal returns. Most studies of the accrual anomaly use a size-based adjustment to calculate abnormal returns. Some studies add an adjustment for book-to-market. To see the effect of adding both a book-to-market and a momentum adjustment in each calculation method, I report the returns from the different benchmarks in separate columns of table 9.
Focusing on the BM adjustments, we see that hedge returns decrease by around 20% from 9.1% to 7.4% (7.1%) when BM (together with size) is used as a benchmark. When momentum is separately accounted for, we see that hedge returns, as expected, slightly increase. Overall, when all three factors are considered, returns decrease to 8.3%. Unreported results of the non-NYSE/AMEX sample reveal a similar pattern, with BM+size having a larger impact, leading to a decline of approximately 40% in hedge returns.
Calendar-time approach. Table 10 reports results of the calendar-time approach. In contrast to the results so far, in this approach I report monthly returns to accrual portfolios that are formed every month, based on newly available accrual information. Firms are assigned to accrual portfolios based on cutoff points from the previous year. This approach overcomes some of the difficulties arising from skewness and cross-sectional dependence. Table 10 indicates that returns to the accrual strategy are still high and statistically significant. For example, the basic accrual strategy earns an average monthly return of 0.74% over the 1988-1999 period. The strategy produced positive returns in 88 of the 144 months. The hypothesis that the accrual strategy is equally likely to result in positive and negative returns is strongly rejected (a p-val of 0.0029). Summary. The analysis in this section shows that implementing a more robust method for calculating benchmark portfolios' returns has little effect on the returns to the accrual strategy. In addition, a book-to-market adjustment accounts for about 20% of the accrual strategy's returns (this affect is larger in the NASDAQ sample). The momentum factor is responsible for a slight increase in the accrual strategy's returns. Finally, applying a calendar-time approach, which enables a more accurate calculation of standard errors, does not diminish the statistical significance of the strategy's returns.
Combined effects of corporate events and normal return benchmarks
In section 5 I demonstrate the effect of corporate events on the returns to the accrual strategy. All the results in that section are based on size-adjusted abnormal returns, to make them comparable to most studies in the literature. In section 6, I report the effects of different calculation methods and different normal return benchmarks on the accrual strategy. In this section I combine the two effects. The purpose of this exercise is to provide an upper bound on the degree to which return measurement and corporate events influence the returns to the accrual strategy. Table 11 reports hedge returns (returns to the low accrual decile minus returns to the high accrual decile) for a sample of NYSE/AMEX firms during 1988-1999. The first row is also reported in table 7.
The left-most column is in the spirit of table 9, although the sample period is different to accommodate the data requirements of some corporate events identifiers. Note that in this table I employ both approaches for calculating benchmark returns, the rebalancing method and the buy-and-hold method. As can be seen from table 11, a combination of adjustment for book-to-market, size and momentum together with exclusion of mergers and divestitures decreases the hedge returns from 8.3% to 6.6%. Overall, after both issues are considered, returns to the accrual strategy decrease from 8.3% to a range of between 4.8% and 7.5%. This constitutes an average decrease of about 25%.
Summary
The accrual anomaly, first documented by Sloan (1996) , introduces a profitable trading strategy that is based on easily obtained accounting information. The interpretation of the evidence has been controversial. On the one hand, some researchers accept the view that the strategy's profitability is a manifestation of systematic pricing errors resulting from overweighing of earnings information and underweighting of cash flow information. Others are more hesitant to adopt this interpretation and call for a series of additional tests. For example, Kothari (2001) highlights several potential problems in calculating the returns to the strategy. Among the issues he mentions are better measures of long-term abnormal returns, survival biases and inference problems arising from cross-sectional dependence.
In this paper I accomplish two goals. First, I establish a link between the accrual anomaly and several corporate events (e.g. mergers and divestitures). Firms that underwent these events have been shown in the finance literature to underperform or overperform several benchmarks in the years following the events. I demonstrate that when firms associated with these events are excluded from the sample, returns to the accrual strategy decrease by up to 25%. The fact that corporate events and the accrual anomaly are correlated is silent with respect to the sources of either the accrual anomaly or the over/under-performance following corporate events. One interpretation, still consistent with the evidence, is that investors are misled by accruals and cause the drift in prices following corporate events.
Alternatively, an unidentified mutual source for both the accrual anomaly and the drift following corporate events is also consistent with the evidence.
Second, I expose the accrual anomaly to a series of new tests that have recently arisen in the finance literature. My results indicate that the accrual anomaly is immune to a more sophisticated method of constructing benchmark portfolios. In addition, I quantify the effect of controlling for book-to-market and momentum, in addition to size. I find a reduction of about 20% in the strategy's returns as a result of the book-to-market control and a decrease of up to 25% after controlling for both corporate events and different return calculation procedures. Finally, I find that applying the calendar-time approach, which addresses cross-sectional dependence and skewness, does not change the statistical significance of the returns to the accrual strategy.
Overall, I conclude that the accrual anomaly is sensitive to the series of tests conducted in this study. However, a substantial portion of it remains unexplained.
Table A1 Lucent Technologies (selected financial statement data, Numbers in millions of US dollars)
The first two columns of the table are the 1999 and 1998 balance sheets as reported in 1999. That is, column (2) is the 1998 comparative numbers. Column (3) reports the original 1998 balance sheet as was reported in 1998. Column (4) is the difference between column (1) and column (3). Column (5) is the difference between column (1) and column (2). It reflects changes in balance sheet items controlling for the effect of the mergers. 
Balance sheets

Mergers and Acquisitions
M&A5
Equals one if the change in goodwill is positive. 
Equity issuance
REST2
Equals one if negative special items (item 17) exceed 1% of lagged total assets (e.g. Elliott and Shaw, 1988) .
Restructurings and divestitures
DIVEST Equals one if changes in inventory calculated from the balance sheet are at least 10% smaller than changes in inventory calculated from the cash flow statement The table reports size-adjusted 12-month returns to portfolios of firms ranked based on the level of accruals or components of accruals specified in the head of each column. Size adjustment is calculated using returns of 10 size portfolios based on NYSE cutoffs. Sample period is 1988-1999. Returns are measured starting four months after fiscal year end to make sure that financial information to form the strategy is available. This panel reports results of NYSE or AMEX firms. NPOS is the number of years (out of 12) in which each strategy resulted in positive returns. Pval is the p-value associated with NPOS, testing the hypothesis that it is equally likely to get positive and negative returns in a given year.
*,**,*** signify statistical significance at the 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on the time-series of annual returns of each decile or of the hedge strategy (portfolio 1 -portfolio 10) . Table 2 : Panel B The table reports size-adjusted 12-month returns to portfolios of firms ranked based on the level of accruals or components of accruals specified in the head of each column. Size adjustment is calculated using returns of 10 size portfolios based on NYSE cutoffs. Sample period is 1988-1999. Returns are measured starting four months after fiscal year end to make sure that financial information to form the strategy is available. This panel reports results of non-NYSE and non-AMEX firms. NPOS is the number of years (out of 12) in which each strategy resulted in positive returns. Pval is the p-value associated with NPOS, testing the hypothesis that it is equally likely to get positive and negative returns in a given year.
*,**,*** signify statistical significance at the 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on the time-series of annual returns of each decile or of the hedge strategy (portfolio 1 -portfolio 10) . Table 6 The Table 7 The table presents size-adjusted 12-month returns to portfolios of NYSE/AMEX firms ranked based on the level of accruals (calculated from the balance sheet). Returns are measured starting four months after fiscal year end to make sure that financial information to form the strategy is available. Sample period is 1988-1999. The column "All" presents returns to all firms that belong to the sample. The rest of the columns exclude certain firms from the sample based on various criteria, while keeping the accrual rankings from the column 'All'. M&A's are identified by several independent flags as follows: M&A1 includes firms if footnote code 1 in Compustat identifies them as an acquirer due to an increase of more than 50% in sales. M&A2 includes firms that are identified by SDC as acquirers in a completed merger in a certain year. M&A3 identifies a merger if changes in inventory calculated from the balance sheet are at least 10% larger than changes in inventory calculated from the statement of cash flows. M&A4 identifies a merger if Compustat item 129, acquisitions from the statement of cash flows, exceeds 10% of total assets. M&A5 identifies a merger if the change in goodwill is positive. Other corporate events are identified as follows: EQUITY identifies an equity offering if Compustat item 108, sale of common stock, is at least 10% of total assets. DEBT identifies a debt issue if Compustat item 111, issuance of long term debt, is at least 10% of total assets. REST1 identifies a restructuring based on whether restructuring charges, Compustat item 66, exceed $10,000. REST2 identifies a restructuring based on whether negative special items, Compustat item 17, exceed 1% of lagged total assets. DIVEST identifies a divestiture if changes in inventory calculated from the balance sheet are at least 10% smaller than changes in inventory calculated from the statement of cash flows. *,**,*** signify statistical significance at the 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on the time-series of annual returns of each decile or of the hedge strategy (portfolio 1 -portfolio 10). Table 8 The table presents size-adjusted 12-month returns to portfolios of NYSE/AMEX firms ranked based on the level of accruals. Returns are measured starting four months after fiscal-year end to make sure that financial information to form the strategy is available. Sample period is 1988-1999. The column "All" presents returns to all firms that belong to the sample. The rest of the columns exclude from the sample certain firms that are associated with different types of mergers, while keeping the accrual rankings from the column 'All'. CASH excludes all firms that had cash-paid mergers during a fiscal year. STOCK excludes all firms that had a stock-based merger during the year. POOL excludes all firms that chose to treat their merger using the pooling method. I include firms with multiple mergers in a fiscal year in the CASH, STOCK or POOL subsamples if over 50% of their mergers were paid in cash, stock or were treated using the pooling method. Hedge 8.3%** 9.6%** 8.0% *** 8.1%** Table 9 The table reports 12-month returns to portfolios of NYSE and AMEX firms ranked annually based on the level of their total accruals that are calculated from the balance sheet. Sample period is 1970-1999. Rebalancing and Buy-and-hold refer to two methods for calculating the long-run returns of benchmark portfolios. Rebalancing method is exposed to the new listing and the rebalancing biases because: (i) the composition of the reference portfolios changes throughout the holding period as a result of new firms being added to the universe of firms; (ii) the reference portfolio weights are periodically rebalanced. Buy-and-hold method constrains the reference portfolio to contain the same firms that were in it at the time when the strategy was first implemented. This method also makes sure that the portfolio weights are not rebalanced periodically. For details, see Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) . Several "normal return" adjustments are employed to compute abnormal returns. On December of each year, firms are assigned to size and book-to-market portfolios. Assignments to momentum-based portfolios are done one month before the implementation of the strategy. The returns from the following reference portfolios are subtracted from each firm's annual returns: Size subtracts the equal-weighted returns of one of 10 size portfolios based on NYSE cutoffs. BM subtracts the equal-weighted returns of one of 10 book-to-market portfolios based on NYSE cutoffs. BM+size subtracts the equal-weighted returns of one of 70 size-book-to-market portfolios based on NYSE cutoffs (5 BM portfolios * 14 size portfolios, where the lowest size decile is further partitioned into 5 equal quintiles). Momentum subtracts the equal-weighted returns of one of 10 momentum portfolios based on returns in the previous 12 months. BM+size+Momentum subtracts the equal-weighted returns of one of 125 Size-BM-momentum portfolios (5*5*5). Returns are measured starting four months after fiscal year end to make sure that financial information to form the strategy is available. *,**,*** signify statistical significance at the 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on the time-series of annual returns of each decile or of the hedge strategy (portfolio 1 -portfolio 10). Table 10 The table reports averages of size-adjusted monthly returns to portfolios of NYSE or AMEX firms ranked based on the level of accruals or components of accruals specified in the head of each column. Size adjustment is calculated using returns of 10 size portfolios based on NYSE cutoffs. Sample period is 1988-1999. Each month, portfolios are rearranged as a result of firms going in and out of accrual portfolios. The assignment is done based on accrual cutoffs from the previous year. NPOS is the number of months (out of 144) in which each strategy resulted in positive returns. Pval is the p-value associated with NPOS, testing the hypothesis that it is equally likely to get positive and negative returns in a given year. Annual ret is a multiplication of Hedge returns by 12, to give a sense of the annual return associated with the monthly hedge returns. *,**,*** signify statistical significance at the 10%,5% and 1% levels, respectively, based on the time-series of annual returns of each decile or of the hedge strategy (portfolio 1 -portfolio 10). Table 11 The table presents 12-month hedge returns to an accrual strategy resulting from buying firms in the low accrual decile and selling firms in the high accrual decile. Firms belong to NYSE/AMEX. Returns are measured starting four months after fiscal-year-end to make sure that financial information to form the strategy is available. Sample period is 1988-1999. The column "All" presents returns to all firms that belong to the sample. The rest of the columns exclude certain firms from the sample based on various criteria, outlined in table 6, while keeping the same accrual rankings from column 'All'. Return adjustments are described in table 8. 
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